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Place of behavior analysis in the changing culture of replication
and statistical reporting in psychological science
Abdulrazaq A. Imam
Department of Psychological Science, University Heights, OH, USA
ABSTRACT
The “new” psychological science seeks to promote a culture of
replication in response to rampant publication bias and some
controversial failures to replicate. Two of the solutions adopted
are the emphases on the New Statistics by Psychological Science
and the growing use of replication repositories. Where does beha-
vior analytic research fit in this effort? Although experimental and
applied research methods in behavior analysis naturally are repli-
cation focused and replication friendly, trending growth in group
designs in different areas of behavior analytic research suggests
that we should be sharing the concerns in the broader psycholo-
gical science community. What measures, if any, are behavior
analytic journals taking or should be taking to address these
concerns? Not all of the solutions under consideration in the
“new” psychological science are amenable to behavior analytic
research. How do we proceed? Recommendations include formu-
lating editorial policies in behavior analytic journals and organiza-
tional programming collaborations, for example, between
Association for Behavior Analysis International and the
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Since its introduction from research in agriculture and wide acceptance in psy-
chology a little before the middle of the last century (Rucci & Tweney, 1980), the
use of null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) in psychological research has
caught on like a wild fire without bounds. Over the years, many have pointed
out how problematic and detrimental the practice is for the science of psychology,
but with little heed. Recent developments in the world of science at large (e.g.,
Fidler, Thomason, Cumming, Finch, & Leeman, 2004), and in psychological
science in particular, have rekindled interest and brought the issues to the fore.
The present commentary explores the nature of the problem within psychological
science, the current efforts to proffer solutions to those problems, and the role
behavior analysis may play in fostering or benefitting from those efforts, broadly
and specifically.
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The problem
Various efforts have been underway in the larger world of psychological science to
address the tripartite problem of a poor replication culture, of p-hacking resulting from
the heavy reliance on NHST, and of the pervasive publication bias associated with it
(Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). The replication problem has two dimensions: (1) the
almost complete absence of the practice of replicating important findings in the field,
which may be a byproduct of the dominance of NHST in the ubiquitous use of group
designs in psychological research, and (2) the high-profile failures that have been
recorded in such areas as priming (Cesario, 2014; Dijksterhuis, 2014; Klatzky &
Creswell, 2014; Simons, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014) and precognition (Alcock,
2011; Bem, 2011; Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012).
The problem of p-hacking is peculiar to NHST in group designs and manifests when
researchers attempt to unsystematically achieve p < .05 by adding participants to groups
after the fact, solely because, statistically, the larger the N, the more likely that p will
approach 0. The reason most do it, of course, is that publication outlets would not
accept reports of p > .05 that is considered statistically not significant, which inherently
leads to publication bias because only statistically significant findings see the light
of day. By publishing only statistically significant research outcomes, the literature is
awash with only positive findings that result in a lopsided body of knowledge, which is
antithetical to building an integrative, cumulative science. The presenting challenge, of
course, is the combination of the tripartite problems of irreproducibility of findings,
p-hacking, and publication bias (Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2011). Of course, these problems are not peculiar to psychology by any means. As
prevalent as they are in other sciences, however, they affect psychological science in
ways that psychologists can no longer afford to ignore them, to the extent that we seek
to build a cumulative science (Branch, 2014; Meehl, 1978).
Current efforts
One could argue that organizational support for efforts to address the tripartite
problems among bodies representing vast numbers of psychologists has been varied
in extent and intensity. For example, the American Psychological Association (APA)
has supported publications such as Kline (2013) that is now in its second edition and
has advocated for the use of effect size in statistical reporting in the current edition of
the APA Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 2009). As far as
advocacy goes, however, that is about it. In contrast, the Association for Psychological
Science (APS) has devoted major volumes in its publication outlets including the
Psychological Science (PS) and Perspectives on Psychological Science (PoPS) to major
discussions of the issues involved and has begun, in earnest, to advocate more
rigorously and actively for changes in the practice of the science. What is different
also in the latter efforts is that the APS has gone beyond mere advocacy to imple-
mentation, the key ingredient lacking in previous attempts, and in admonitions of the
use and abuse of NHST with the attendant problems of replications and replicability,
on the one hand, and publication bias, on the other. These problems are intractable
for the thriving science that psychology aspires to become.
What role for behavior analysts?
I recall in my graduate school days the debates that accompanied concerns for the future of
behavior analysis in the larger discipline of psychology with solutions proffered ranging from
praxics to behaviorology, both representing an actual name change (Epstein, 1984; Fraley,
1987; see Malagodi & Branch, 1985) in contrast to paradigmatic behaviorism (Staats, 1986).
For the most part, behavior analysis has remained mostly in psychology and education
departments across the United States and in many parts of the world. Many of the points
of contention in the discussion centered on how behavior analysis and psychology differ from
one another, in terms of philosophy, methodology, and general goals and objectives. Besides
keeping the name “behavior analysis”within psychology (a la Division 25 of the APA), recent
developments in the area proffered substantial progress, the least of which is not a thriving
certification of practitioners in applied behavior analysis started about a decade ago (BACB).
Whereas the calls for separation may have failed, in practice, behavior analysis and psychol-
ogy have remained relatively isolated from each other, a marriage of convenience in which
each is blissfully doing its own thing, for the most part, with limited “cross-pollination”. The
more recent wave of interest in the methodological concerns of replicability, p-hacking, and
publication bias led by the APS represents a development within psychology in which
behavior analysis may be in a position to simultaneously contribute as well as benefit from
the proffered solutions. Broadly, the solutions being pursued currently to address these
problems include promoting the adoption of the “new statistics” (Cumming, 2014a) and
encouragement of various replication efforts (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) in the field.
Why should behavior analysts care about these efforts?
To start with, in recent decades, there has been growing reports of NHST in the pages
of journals that publish behavior analytic research, including Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior (JEAB) and The Psychological Record (TPR). Zimmermann,Watkins,
and Poling reported “progressive increase over time in the percentage of articles reporting
an inferential statistic” (2015, p. 209) in JEAB involving both human and nonhuman
subjects. Such development is partly due to the growth in topical coverage within
behavior analysis; for example, it is not uncommon to see reports on stimulus equivalence
relying on NHST. The “new statistics” recommends the estimation approach, which
requires reporting of effect sizes (ESs), confidence intervals (CIs), and meta-analyses,
over NHST. The recommendation is in agreement with those of the current APA
publication manual (American Psychological Association, 2009), and psychological jour-
nals, particularly those published by the APS, have begun requiring it (e.g., Eich, 2014;
Psychological Science, 2017). What would European Journal of Behavior Analysis
(EJOBA), Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA), JEAB, Mexican Journal of
Behavior Analysis (MJBA), The Behavior Analyst (TBA), and TPR do? Are these behavior
analytic journals going to begin to require reports of ESs, CIs, and meta-analyses in
studies reporting group-design data (see Parker, Vannest, & Davis, 2011 for Small-N
alternatives) as other psychological journals such as PS have started to do in accordance
with the recommendations of the latest version of the APA manual (American
Psychological Association, 2009)? There are good reasons to suggest that we should. A
cursory check of author guidelines and instructions to authors in the latest volumes of
these behavioral journals, including Behavioural Processes (BP), however, did not include
standards for statistical reporting like the ones provided by PS (e.g., reporting CIs instead
of standard deviation [SD] or SE on point estimates), despite their growing use (e.g.,
Zimmermann et al., 2015). PS provides authors with a recommendation and a rationale
for it, and specifies formatting standards (e.g., reporting exact p-values instead of relative
p-values as is commonly done), in addition (see Psychological Science, 2017, for further
details).
Another corollary of these efforts that should interest behavior analysts is what
Cumming (2014b; 7:00–11:30; 2014c; 26:50) refers to as “statistical cognition”.
According to Cumming, because there has been little research on the use of NHST
by researchers in various scientific fields in the literature, psychologists are best posi-
tioned to conduct research on how they use and interpret data. His own team’s research
(e.g., Coulson, Healey, Fidler, & Cumming, 2010) examining how people “think, talk,
and feel about p-value” (Cumming, 2014b, 11:42) illustrates such effort. One of the
major findings is that despite seeing only point estimates with their CIs, some research-
ers still referenced the data in terms of NHST! Cumming noted that even when they
saw CIs they think of NHST (my emphasis), concluding that perhaps we might be
better off doing away with reporting p-values altogether when reporting CIs. In fact,
however, the data supporting that conclusion were only mentions of NHST, not what
the researchers thought (see Cumming, 2014b, 8:44–10:00; my emphases) about NHST.
Again, there is a plenty of opportunity for behavior analysts to contribute to such efforts
to improve our understanding of scientific behavior.
Indeed, Cumming himself appeared to have provided such framework in his presenta-
tion, perhaps without meaning to do so. He characterized people’s relationship to p-values
in terms of how they “think, talk, and feel” about it (Cumming, 2014b, 12:38–14:39). I
encourage readers to watch the segment. In a nutshell, it reads something like this: (1) p is a
measure of strength (a la Fisher); (2) … that elicits significance language; (3) … which
suggests truth; (4)…evokes emotions; and (5) has real-life consequences! (my emphases, but
the exclamation is in the original). These are familiar references to this readership. What
contingencies support the widespread use of NHST, not only in the wider psychological
science community, but also increasingly in behavior analysis, despite its shortcomings?
What remedies are necessary to tackle adequately and effectively the attendant problems?
These and many other related questions are well within the purview of behavior analysis;
the potential is vast and the ground fertile. Smaldino andMcElreath (2016) offered a recent
natural selection perspective on doing bad science. Surely, others closer to home based on
selection by consequences (Skinner, 1981) can be rendered. Incidentally, one of the
strategies adopted in PS is to assign three different Open Science Forum (OSF) badges
for published articles meeting criteria for preregistration, open materials, and open data, in
their promotion of replication efforts (Cumming, 2014c; 19:55; see also Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 2018; for their adoption). Such badges appear to be
veritable consequences! What are the implications of providing such powerful conse-
quences for something like preregistration that is antithetical to behavior analytic research
(see further discussion below; see also Koole & Lakens, 2012)? Could alternatives be
developed that wouldmeet the needs of behavior analytic approaches? These are additional
reasons for behavior analysts to get involved and embrace these efforts.
Furthermore, of the many efforts already underway on statistical reform promoting
the estimation approach outlined by Cumming (2014c), one is particularly noteworthy
in support of behavior analysts’ involvement. Geoff Loftus was the editor for Memory
and Cognition from 1993 to 1997 during which he promoted use of error bars on
graphs. Cumming reported a decline in the practice after his editorial term ended
(2014c, 21:26; see Finch et al., 2004). The lesson here is that contingency management,
as we know, requires effective managing for long-term maintenance of behavior; the
rules are not enough. We know a thing or two about rule-governed behavior (Hayes,
1989). As behavior analysts, how can we advance sound reporting practices in psycho-
logical science? Various projects on research integrity also are underway on the related
matter of transparency in support of the replication efforts. A couple of them may have
direct implications for behavior analysis, namely, the OSF under the Center for Open
Science and the Registered Replication Report of PoPS (Cumming, 2014c; 14:06–15:48;
see Psychological Science, n.d.). The problem is that they require a declaration of
protocols and/or preregistration, both of which may be antithetical to the way we
tend to conduct experiments in behavior analysis (Neuringer, 1991; Sidman, 1960).
The issue is that given the rigor and painstaking data collection that is characteristic of
Small-N designs commonly used in behavior analysis that render it “slow” compared to
the “snapshot” approach of group designs that render them “fast”, the first provides a
leaner “schedule” than the second one does as far as building careers in psychological
science is concerned. Consequently, one could argue that psychologists have been
differentially reinforced for using group designs, and for all the attendant p-hacking,
more than for using Small-N designs! This is a challenge for behavior analysts in the
new efforts, requiring further analysis and attention. Part of that analysis would have to
consider how selective attention to novel findings (publication bias) in psychological
science has promoted selection for novelty, which obviates focus on replication.
Replication, of course, is inherently integral to the various Small-N designs commonly
used in behavior analysis (Branch, 2014; Sidman, 1960). Interestingly, even PS cannot
seem to wean itself, despite APS’s advocacy efforts to the contrary, of the root of this
publication bias: “Preference is given to papers that make a new and notable contribu-
tion—an idea, a discovery, a connection—to psychological science, broadly interpreted
to include emerging as well as established areas of research” (Psychological Science,
2017).
Cumming (2014d, 27:40) concluded his remarks on the ongoing APS efforts with an eight-
step outline of how to implement the estimation approach in the new psychology. These
warrant comments to provide a framework for how behavior analysts may proceed in getting
involved in the ongoing efforts in the wider psychological science community. The first step
seeks to redirect psychologists from testing null by asking “is this treatment better”
(Cumming, 2014a, p. 14) to adopting estimation by asking “How much …?”, “To what
extent…?”, “Howmany…?”, which he considers “the key to a more quantitative discipline”
(Cumming, 2014b, 27:40). The estimation alternative offered in place of NHST excludes the
“What if …?” or “I wonder what would happen if…” sort of question that might precede a
hunch as part of “scientific play” (Neuringer, 1991, pp. 7–8) common in behavior analytic
research (Sidman, 1960).What is the implication of this gap for the place of behavior analysis
in this new culture in psychological science? The second step simply advocates matching the
choice of ESs to the research question. The third step, however, seeks a complete statement of
intent concerning “procedure, data analysis”, etc. (Cumming, 2014b; 27:40; see also
Psychological Science, n.d.). This could be highly problematic from a behavior-analytic
perspective such as that provided by Neuringer. Additionally, according to Sidman, “there
can be no explicit rules for determining the most appropriate replicative technique. The
method to be employed will be selected from the choices made available by the experimental
data and by the control techniques at hand” (1960, p. 138). Prespecification seems to preclude
adopting techniques guided by the experimental data.
The fourth step urges psychologists to compute and report “point and interval estimates
(CIs) for [the chosen] ESs”, and the fifth advocates graphing error bars with CIs (Cumming,
2014b, 27:40). Both of these are useful for behavior analysis as well and warrant no further
commentary. Step 6 “calls for informed judgement, rather than a mechanistic statement of
statistical significance” (Cumming, 2014a, p. 14). This is a welcome but familiar process for
most behavior-analytic researchers. We are in a better position to contribute substantially
and substantively, given the differential contingency placed on use of group designs
mentioned above, with our experiences in relying on “subjective” judgments common in
visual inspection of data, for example. As Sidman put it
Whether or not we make an inductive inference, and the degree of tenacity with which we
cling to that inference, will depend upon our behavioral history (experience). I refer to this
history when I say that the evaluation of generality is a matter of judgment. From an act of
induction based upon our own accumulated experience, we judge the amount of generality
to be added to a variable when it proves effective in experiments that have little or no
operational connection with each other. (1960, p. 59; my emphasis)
The kind of judgments involved in estimation is one that is unfamiliar to most
psychologists because of the heavy reliance on dichotomous thinking inherent in
NHST. Alternative ways of thinking about data and analyses (e.g., Branch, 2014;
Fiedler, 2017; Killeen, 2005a, 2005b,; Sidman, 1960) may be ripe for consideration or
reconsideration by the wider psychological science community. Behavior analysts are
positioned to play a beneficial role. The final two steps call for meta-analytic thinking
and complete reporting, both of which are useful for behavior analysis as well.
Altogether, these steps seem amenable segways to having an important impact on the
process that is underway in the current culture changes in psychological science.
Finally, the foregoing is not meant to suggest that there has been no involvement
by behavior analysts at all in the debates concerning the problematic excessive
reliance on NHST by psychologists. Notable exceptions are Branch (1999, 2014)
and Killeen (2005a, 2005b, 2006), both of whom have made substantive contributions
to the debates (Cumming, 2005; Doros & Geier, 2005; Macdonald, 2006;
Wagenmakers & Grunwald, 2006) over the status and potential solutions to the
problems associated with the pervasive use of NHST in psychological science.
What has yet to happen thus are organizational and editorial policy movements in
the Association for Behavior Analysis International (ABAI) and allied parties like the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group and in behavior-analytic journals regarding
the ongoing efforts in the extant psychological science community. ABAI and APS
have opportunities to collaborate and coordinate. Every now and then, for example,
they hold their annual meetings in Chicago during the Memorial Day weekend but
never coordinate programming. These are missed opportunities. Furthermore, the
APS also has begun an international convention of psychological science that has
been so far held in European countries; the next is in Paris, France, in March 2019.
Could EAHB and APS hold meetings around the same times and locale to allow for
fruitful collaborations and exchanges, given that the two organizations hold their
meetings in spring? Joint or shared workshops could serve as springboards for
educating members of the respective organizations on methodological concerns that
could shed light on common threads and debate points of methodological contention
across perspectives. What measures, if any, are behavior analytic journals taking or
should be taking to address the changes in statistical reporting practices (e.g.,
Cumming et al., 2007) that are being suggested in the ongoing efforts? A good
place to start is adopting editorial policies on statistical reporting practices similar
to those of PS (see Psychological Science, 2017) so that they can begin to move away
from discredited NHST practices and behavior analytic authors using group designs
can begin to update their analytic and reporting standards.
Concluding remarks
In a recent study comparing reporting practices of two behavioral journals in
psychological science, JEAB and BP, in 2011 and 2015 (the years before and after
the publication of the PoPS papers on the change advocacy); for example, the
authors used error bars on graphs in both journals, but BP’s use was higher than
JEAB’s. Both journals reported standard deviation (SD) and standard error of the
mean (SEM) in both years, but BP reported more SEM than SD in both years; only
in 2015 was this true for JEAB. Reporting of CI, unfortunately, was very limited in
JEAB in both years compared to BP. The only ES measures reported by JEAB were
partial η2 and Cohen’s d in both years; both measures, as well as reporting of η2,
were higher in 2015 than 2011 in BP. Both journals also reported actual replications
in both years, although JEAB recorded a decline in 2015 despite higher reports than
BP in both years (Frate & Imam, 2016). Thus, whereas these behavioral journals
unsurprisingly reported replications (see above; also Branch, 2014), they were not
consistent universally across the board on statistical reporting practices as would be
expected under the estimation approach of the new psychological science. As noted
above, therefore, it will be useful to have coherent editorial policies and guidelines
for authors on statistical reporting standards across behavior analytic journals.
Perhaps these and other efforts would provide a conduit to greater recognition of
the presence and place of behavior analysis in the new and growing culture of
replication and statistical reporting practices in psychological science, to contrast
well with the debates of the 1980s and 1990s about where we stood with respect to
the rest of psychology.
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